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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose 
This paper addresses the nature, formalization, and neural bases of (affective) social ties and 
discusses the relevance of ties for health economics. A social tie is defined as an affective 
weight attached by an individual to the well-being of another individual (‘utility 
interdependence’). Ties can be positive or negative, and symmetric or asymmetric between 
individuals. Characteristic of a social tie, as conceived of here, is that it develops over time 
under the influence of interaction, in contrast with a trait like altruism. Moreover, a tie is not 
related to strategic behavior such as reputation formation but seen as generated by affective 
responses. 
 
Methodology/approach 
A formalization is presented together with some supportive evidence from behavioral 
experiments. This is followed by a discussion of related psychological constructs and the 
presentation of suggestive existing neural findings. To help prepare the grounds for a model-
based neural analysis some speculations on the neural networks involved are provided, together 
with suggestions for future research. 
 
Findings 
Social ties are not only found to be important from an economic viewpoint, it is also shown 
that they can be modeled and related to neural substrates.  
 
Originality/value of the paper 
By providing an overview of the economic research on social ties and connecting it with the 
broader behavioral and neuroeconomics literature, the paper may contribute to the 
development of a neuroeconomics of social ties. 
 
 
Keywords:  social ties, affect, modeling, neuroeconomics 
 
Conceptual paper 
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1 Introduction 
 
Interpersonal attachments appear to play a key role in human life. As extensively documented 
by Baumeister and Leary (1995), people form social attachments readily and resist the 
dissolution of existing bonds. A broad assortment of psychological evidence pleads in favor of 
the hypothesis put forward by these authors that the desire for affective interpersonal 
relationships is a fundamental human motivation. From an evolutionary viewpoint this 
readiness to form groups makes sense, for example, as a behavioral mechanism to protect 
against external threats. Furthermore, in line with the hypothesis, there are many studies 
indicating that mental and physical health problems are more common among people who lack 
close personal relationships, that is, if they involve positive interaction (op. cit., pp. 508-511; 
see also Berscheid and Reis, (1998)). For instance, without bonds marked by positive concern 
and caring, people are more likely to be unhappy, depressed, and anxious. Apart from being 
important for health and subjective well-being, interpersonal attachments – or, social ties, as 
we will call them below – show significant cognitive and emotional effects related to their 
tendency to blur the boundaries between the relationship partner and the self (“to include the 
other in the self”).  
 Notwithstanding this wealth of evidence, processes of interpersonal attachment have 
been neglected in formal models of social interaction. This also holds for recent models in 
behavioral economics and game theory that allow for other-regarding preferences (like inequity 
aversion or reciprocity), as we will discuss in greater detail below. What is missing is the 
incorporation of affective processes providing the ‘social glue’ for attachment. Note that doing 
so would give relations an individualized, historical, and context dependent content. This 
would further help to bridge the gap between an ‘undersocialized’ and an ‘oversocialized’ 
account of human behavior that characterizes many models (Granovetter, 1985). The former is 
characteristic for neoclassical economic models assuming narrowly selfish behavior, while the 
latter characterizes models in economics and sociology assuming agents with fully internalized 
social norms (like fairness or equity). In both cases, behavior is atomized in the sense that it is 
not embedded in culture as an ongoing process that is continuously constructed and 
reconstructed during interaction. 
 The significance of affect in interpersonal relationships is increasingly acknowledged 
also in economics (see, e.g., Elster, 1998; Loewenstein, 2000). This tendency is reinforced by 
recent neuroscientific findings and the concomitant rise of social neuroeconomics (Fehr and 
Camerer, 2007; Sanfey, 2007). Already, a few models have been developed formalizing 
interpersonal behavior as the outcome of interacting affective and deliberative systems 
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(Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 2007; van Dijk and van Winden, 1997; van Winden, 2001). In 
this chapter, we will focus on the dual-system model of van Dijk and van Winden (1997), 
which explicitly deals with the affective processes involved in interpersonal attachment.   
The organization of this chapter is as follows. After a brief summary of the state of the 
art in the (economic) modeling of social interaction, Section 2 presents an outline of the social 
ties model of van Dijk and van Winden (1997) and shortly reports on the behavioral 
experimental evidence regarding this model. Section 3 is concerned with an exploration of 
what we know at this stage about the neural substrates of ties, based on the existing literature, 
paying special attention to the constructs of empathy and sympathy. It also provides some 
speculations on the neural correlates of social ties. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2 Social ties 
 
2.1 Social ties: Introduction 
 
Economists are well aware that for a variety of strategic and non-strategic reasons individuals 
may show behavior that seems to conflict with the assumed behavior of homo economicus − 
the fully rational and narrowly selfish agent populating most economic models (see e.g. Fehr 
and Schmidt, 2005; Sobel, 2005) One strategic reason is that such behavior may help to build 
up a reputation (e.g., of being cooperative) which is expected to further one’s selfish interests 
in the future, even though it hurts these interests in the short-run. While this is still compatible 
with narrowly selfish behavior, this is not the case with another (non-strategic) reason that 
regularly pops up in the literature, which is altruism, that is, behavior that is costly to the actor 
and beneficial to the recipient. Envy or spitefulness, defined as costly behaviors that are also 
costly for the recipient, have received some attention too, albeit to a much lesser extent. Both 
types of (unconditional) behavior are assumed to stem from other-regarding preferences, 
formalized through interdependent utility functions, where, in the case of altruism (envy), a 
positive (negative) weight is attached to the utility or welfare of other individuals. 
More recently, another type of other-regarding preference, related to inequity aversion, 
has attracted much attention. In that case, an individual´s utility function is embellished with an 
argument representing differences in payoffs with other individuals. A different strand of 
recent models focuses on intention-based reciprocity, defined as costly (un)kind behavior in 
response to the (un)kind behavior of another person. This is modelled by incorporating beliefs 
about the intentions or about the (kindness of the) type of the other person into the individual´s 
utility function. We will return to these models in the next section. Here, we would like to 
 5
emphasize that in these revisions of the homo economicus model, only stable other-regarding 
preferences have been accounted for, which show no time dependency. Furthermore, there is 
hardly any serious attempt to explicitly deal with the affective processes involved.1 This brings 
us to our discussion of affective social ties, where both these aspects of existing models will be 
challenged. 
To explain how social interactions can influence economic interactions through the 
development of affective ties, we need to become more specific about the notion of a social tie 
(a formal representation is given in the next section). Basically, a social tie refers to a caring 
about the interests of a specific other person, based on feelings experienced while interacting 
with that other person. Sentiments are the affective component of interpersonal attachments 
and are considered to be a key element of a social tie (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; see also 
Granovetter, 1973). Feelings that individuals have with respect to specific others are related to 
the extent they care about the welfare of those others. The more they care in a positive way, the 
stronger the affective bond and ‘we’ feeling is supposed to be. However, it is important to note 
that a social tie is not simply determined by the weight that an individual attaches to the 
welfare of another person.  
In general, if positive or negative sentiments are maintained towards others, a social tie 
can only be said to exist if the weight attached to this specific other’s well-being differs from 
the weight given to the well-being of a ‘generalized other (van Dijk and van Winden, 1997).’ 
Furthermore, the strength and the valence of a tie are supposed to depend on the interaction 
between the individuals concerned, which can be experienced as more or less beneficial or 
harmful. It is the accumulated affective experience that is taken to matter for the sign and size 
of the weight attached to the specific other’s interests. In this respect, a social tie is like a 
capital good (a stock variable), built up through investments over time. This makes the 
development of a social tie inherently dynamic and its strength subject to change. In this 
process, differences in personality are likely to play a role. Individual differences in tolerance, 
rationality, altruism, or emotionality may be crucial for the speed with which positive or 
negative ties develop, and their mutuality (symmetry). 
 
 
2.2 Social ties: A formal model 
 
In this section we present a formalization of social ties based on van Dijk and van Winden 
(1997), in the sequel referred to as the vDvW-model. An important advantage of formalization 
                                                 
1 An exception is Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s (2007) dual-system model of altruism. 
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is that it enables the development of rigorous theory and a coherent framework for testable 
hypotheses. Its relevance will be illustrated in the context of the voluntary provision of a public 
good. 
A public good is characterized by the fact that no one can be excluded from its 
consumption while, in addition, its consumption by someone does not rival with the 
consumption by someone else. A classic example concerns the defence of a country against 
external aggressors. However, here, we are more interested in local public goods, like for small 
communities, neighborhoods, social networks or groups. Relevant examples are the provision 
of security, a healthy, clean or pleasant environment, common information, or the 
establishment and maintenance of social norms (through sanctions).  
The following simple public good game captures the essence of the voluntary provision 
of a public good. Suppose there are two players, A and B, both endowed with an amount of 
money of y euros. The money can be spent on private goods and a public good. Let j’s 
contribution to the public good be denoted by gj (with j = A, B). Normalizing the price of both 
the private and the public good to one, the consumption of private goods by j, denoted as xj, 
equals:  xj = y − gj, while the consumption of the public good, indicated by g, equals g = gA + 
gB for both players. The welfare, or utility, derived from the consumption of xj and g is denoted 
by Uj(xj, g). For illustration, suppose that both players have the same linear utility function: 
Uj(xj, g) = xj + mg [= y − gj + m(gA + gB)], where m stands for the marginal per capita return 
on public good contributions. Typically, it is assumed for these games that 0 < m < 1 and nm > 
1, with n the number of players. Thus, in our case, let 2m > 1 and assume that both players 
have to decide only once (one-shot game). Then, it is easily seen that a rational and selfish 
(own utility maximizing) player will not contribute to the public good (gj = 0, leading to a 
utility of y), even though both players would be better off if they would contribute all their 
money (gj = y, rendering a utility of 2my, which is larger than y). Whatever the other player is 
expected to do, it is always in one’s (selfish) interest not to contribute. More generally, the 
private provision of public goods seems to be haunted by a ‘free-riding’ problem, in the sense 
that all want to benefit from the contributions by others without putting an own effort into it 
which is adequate from a social point of view (that is, taking the benefits for others into 
account). 
According to the general standard model of public goods (see Bergstrom et al., 1986), 
the welfare losses to a social group from free riding tend to become larger the bigger the 
group.2 Moreover, generally, the equilibrium public good level turns out to be invariant to the 
distribution of the endowments (income) and also to an income-tax financed public provision 
                                                 
2 In the standard model the individually optimal contribution level need not be zero (but falls short of the socially 
optimal level). 
 7
of some of the good. In the latter case, public provision simply replaces (crowds out) private 
provision, one for one. Theoretically, socially better outcomes can be obtained if the game is 
not one-shot, but repeatedly played over an infinite or uncertain time span, basically because 
players (may) perceive sufficient opportunity to punish uncooperative behavior (see e.g. 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). In case of a finitely repeated game, with a known fixed ending, 
larger contributions can be sustained if the likelihood exists that some players (for whatever 
reason) are cooperative but will negatively react to free-riding (like tit-for-tat players, see 
Kreps et al., 1982). In that event, even a selfish player might want to build up a reputation for 
being cooperative, for some time. However, evidence from laboratory experiments shows that 
substantial contributions occur even in a one-shot linear public good game, like the one 
discussed above, or in the last round of such a game, where zero contributions are predicted 
(for a survey, see Ledyard, 1995; see also Sadiraj, 2007). To explain these ‘anomalous’ 
experimental findings, over the last decade or so several models have been proposed that 
incorporate some kind of other-regarding preferences (see the previous section). These 
preferences may relate to an interest in the distribution of outcomes (like altruism or inequity 
aversion) or to reciprocity based either on the (un)kindness of other players’ behavioral 
intentions (e.g., fairness) or the type of the other players (e.g., selfish, altruistic, or spiteful).3 
For example, it is easy to see that even in a one-shot linear public good game, sufficiently 
inequity-averse individuals may contribute to the public good if others contribute as well. 
Three important characteristics of these new models are that they (1) assume stable 
other-regarding preferences; (2) do not specify any emotional mechanisms that are, at least 
implicitly, referred to (as in intention-based models); and, (3) focus on static equilibria. The 
vDvW-model differs in these respects because of its focus on affect as a driving factor of 
other-regarding preferences and its explicitly dynamic nature. The model concerns a finitely 
repeated two-person (non-linear) public good game. For notational convenience, using the 
notation introduced in the example above, we will focus on player A in the game and leave out 
the time index. As argued in the previous section, the affective component is taken to be a key 
element of a social tie. The feelings a person (consciously or unconsciously) experiences with 
respect to the specific other in a tie are related to the extent s/he cares about the well-being of 
that specific other person. Staying close to traditional economic modelling this is formalized 
through an interdependent utility function 
 
VA = ln UA + αA ln UB                                                                                                   (1) 
                                                 
3 Regarding outcome-based models, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). For intention-
based models, see Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). For mixed models, see Charness and Rabin 
(2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Levine (1998) presents a ‘types’ model.  
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and similarly for B, where Uj(xj, g), yj = xj + gj (j = A, B), and g = gA + gB.4 Furthermore, the 
weight αA attached to the utility of B represents A’s tie with B; that is, the valence and the 
intensity of the sentiment that A experiences with respect to B. Mutatis mutandis, the same 
holds for αB. Based on empirical evidence (Goeree et al., 2002; Liebrand, 1984; Sawyer, 1966), 
it is assumed that −1 < αj < 1 (j = A, B). Note that B need not necessarily maintain a similar tie 
with A; that is, αA need not be equal to αB.5 
Let us focus first on some stark cases when αj is fixed. If αj = 0, we are back to the 
standard economic model with selfish preferences. If αj → 1, approximately, an equal weight 
becomes attached to both own and other’s well-being, inducing fully cooperative behavior 
(efficiency). In sharp contrast, if αj → −1, behavior becomes maximally uncooperative, 
inducing a minimal contribution level. Consequently, the existence of social ties can 
dramatically influence the private provision of a public good. Furthermore, with fixed social 
ties, government provision financed through an income tax would lead to a one-for-one 
crowding out of private provision, as in the standard model without social ties. Interestingly, 
some experimental support has been provided for the predictive power of the (log-linearized) 
Cobb-Douglas specification of VA represented by (1) in explaining contributions in (one-shot) 
linear public good games (Goeree et al., 2002).6 In addition, this study finds substantial 
heterogeneity of αj across individuals, with estimates ranging between −0.5 and +0.5. Cox and 
Sadiraj (2007) show that this type of model can explain several stylized facts regarding last-
round contributions in linear public good games (where reputation and future reciprocity 
cannot play a role), in contrast with inequity aversion models.  
As mentioned above, existing models of other-regarding preferences are typically static, 
not allowing for any intertemporal effects.7 Although such preferences may be genetically 
and/or culturally determined (via the instilment of norms), the vDvW-model focuses on a 
mechanism that is intrinsically dynamic and non-strategic, involving autonomic affective 
responses in the limbic system of the brain. Based on (social) psychological findings8, this 
                                                 
4 Without loss of generality, we use here a logarithmic transformation of the multiplicative Cobb-Douglas 
specification in the vDvW-model. Note furthermore that if VB would be substituted for UB in eq. (1) the model’s 
results mentioned below would not be affected in a qualitative sense.  
5 For simplicity, we neglect for the moment the possibility of a general attitude towards other people, which is to 
be distinguished from a social tie concerning a specific other person. See the next subsection.   
6 Cox et al. (2007) apply a (CES) generalization of this specification to the data sets of several experimental 
studies concerning a variety of games (other than public good games). Their estimates show that in most cases (5 
out of 7) a Cobb-Douglas specification cannot be rejected. For a similarly specified model incorporating 
emotions, see van Winden (2001). 
7 This also holds for the model of Cox et al. (2007) where α (the ‘emotional state’) is supposed to depend on a 
reciprocity variable (related to payoffs) and relative status. 
8 See, e.g., Homans (1950), Frijda (1986), Coleman (1990), and the wealth of studies surveyed in Baumeister and 
Leary (1995).  
 9
model assumes that ties develop as an unconscious by-product of prolonged interaction which 
generates positive (negative) sentiments if valued positively (negatively), and that they may 
decay over time. In the context of a public good game, the valuation of the interaction is likely 
to depend on the contributions to the public good. In the model this is captured for A by the 
‘impulse’: 
 
GA = gB  − εA gA                                                                                                            (2) 
 
and similarly for B, where εA reflects A’s tolerance or reference level regarding B’s 
contribution. For example, if εj = 0 (j = A, B), then any contribution by the other player is 
positively valued, whereas it should at least match j’s own contribution if εj = 1. Taking into 
account the possibility of attrition, the development of a tie over time is formalized for A by the 
following differential equation: 
 
   dαA/dt = fA(GA, αA)                                                                                           (3) 
 
and similarly for B. Figure 1 presents a phase diagram of equation (3), assuming a diminishing 
marginal impact of the impulse:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If ties do not decay over time, then stationarity (dαA/dt = fA = 0) is compatible with any αA if 
the impulse GA is zero (horizontal part of dashed line b), whereas for positive (negative) values 
of the impulse the tie grows to its upper (lower) bound of 1 (−1). With attrition, the upward 
sloping solid line a shows the level of the impulse GA required to compensate for the decay 
such that a particular value of αA can be sustained. Specifically, note that a sustained impulse 
Take in Figure 1  
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GA ≠ 0 is required for αA ≠ 0. To analyze the dynamics of tie formation, the vDvW-model 
makes the simplifying assumption that individuals are myopic. This implies that they do not 
take into account the potential impact of their contributions on their own future feelings and the 
feelings of others towards them. Although perhaps not completely realistic, this assumption 
finds some empirical support in the evidence that people show a tendency to underweight their 
own and others’ future emotions (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999). As a 
consequence, the dynamics can be modeled as a sequence of contribution decisions connected 
by the development of the tie over time. To illustrate, we assume that players are identical (and 
0 < εj < 1).9 Figure 2 shows the phase diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For explanation, suppose we have a negative value of αA. Decay over time would make αA less 
negative. For stationarity, that is, to keep αA from becoming less negative, this decay effect 
needs to be offset by a sufficiently negative value of GA, requiring that A’s contribution is 
larger than B’s (since εA < 1; see (2)). But, this implies that αB would have to be more negative 
than αA, which explains why the A-curve (where fA = 0) is located below the dashed line in the 
3rd quadrant of the diagram. Similarly, for αA = 0 stationarity demands that GA = 0, which 
again implies that αB would have to be smaller than αA, and negative. When αA becomes 
positive, GA must also be positive to compensate for the attrition (which would now decrease 
the value of αA). Consequently, for stationarity (see again the A-curve) αB increases and 
switches sign. As αA becomes more and more positive, αB must become larger than αA at some 
point, due to the assumed declining marginal impact of larger values of GA. Because 
individuals are assumed to be identical, the A-curve and the B-curve (where fA = 0 and fB = 0, 
respectively) are symmetric and cross where αA = αB. The arrows in the diagram show the 
                                                 
9 Furthermore, an interior equilibrium, with gj > 0, is assumed if αj = 0.  
Take in Figure 2  
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direction of movement of the ties (αA and αB) in that particular region of the diagram. 
Eventually, one will end up in this case at the intersection of the two solid curves. 
Some of the main results of the vDvW-model, focusing on the impact of differences in 
income and preferences for public and private goods, are the following. First of all, a unique 
social ties equilibrium exists.10 With equal preferences and incomes, the ties are symmetric and 
positive (αA = αB > 0), boosting the voluntary provision of the public good. In case of different 
preferences or income levels, the ties are asymmetric (αA ≠ αB) and the one with the lower 
value may be negative, in which event contributions are lowered, against one’s own direct 
interests, to hurt the person concerned. Furthermore, with different incomes, the provision level 
of public goods may be lower than the level derived from the standard model due to the 
potential development of negative ties. 
In contrast with the invariance result of the standard model of public goods, in case of 
social ties, government intervention need no longer be neutral with respect to the provision 
level of the public good. If some of the public good is provided by the government (and 
financed by an income tax), the total provision level may go down, because of a crowding out 
of intrinsic motivation through a negative effect on social ties. On the other hand, for similar 
reasons, government intervention can have a positive impact on the provision of public goods 
if a community is characterized by negative ties or facing substantial mobility or migration 
which breaks up existing networks. Also, note that a reduction in public provision will not 
immediately be taken over by private provision (if at all), because the formation of ties takes 
time.  
 
 
2.3 Social ties: Evidence from the lab 
 
In this section we present some behavioral experimental support for the social ties mechanism 
formalized by the vDvW-model. The tool used in these behavioral experiments to measure 
social ties is based on the psychological ‘Ring-test of social value orientation (Liebrand, 
1984).’ In this test each participant is randomly coupled with an anonymous other participant, 
and has to choose repeatedly between two ‘self-other’ payoff combinations. Each such 
combination allocates a positive or negative number of points (to be exchanged for real money 
at the end of the experiment) between the decision-maker and the participant s/he is matched 
with. All payoff combinations lie on a circle with the origin as center (which explains the name 
                                                 
10 Because van Dijk and van Winden (1997) prove that the equilibrium of their model is locally stable (based on 
the Jacobean of the system at its equilibrium), in general, convergence is (only) assured for ‘small’ departures 
from the equilibrium. 
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of this test), with on the horizontal axis points allocated to the decision maker him- or herself 
(Self) and on the vertical axis points allocated to the other person (Other). Each allocation pair 
can be seen as a vector. Figure 3 presents an example. Adding all the choices of a participant 
renders an aggregate vector. The angle of this vector with the horizontal axis provides a 
measure of the extent to which this participant cares about a ‘generalized other,’ that is, his or 
her ‘social value orientation’. The predictive validity of people’s social value orientation has 
been shown by many studies (see e.g. Rusbult and van Lange, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
 
 
However, a tie refers to a specific other, not a generalized other. Therefore, to measure 
a social tie van Dijk et al. (2002) applied the test twice: once before social interaction, and a 
second time after the interaction. In the second case, the participant is no longer linked with a 
randomly selected other but with the participant s/he interacted with. The sign and the size of 
the difference in the aggregate vectors (angles) thus determined, respectively, represent the 
valence and the strength of the social tie established through the interaction. Without correcting 
for social value orientation − measured by the angle of the vector obtained from the first test − 
the angle from the second test would reflect the more general sentiment of an individual with 
respect to the specific other interacted with.11 Applying this procedure in a repeated two-person 
nonlinear) public good game experiment12, they obtained the following results. First of all, they 
found a mean angle of the first Ring-test equal to 3°, with a large majority (95%) of the 
individual angles being located between −45° and +45°. This implies that the absolute weight 
                                                 
11 By applying this procedure to a control group, which faced an individual decision task without social 
interaction between the two tests, van Dijk et al. (2002) found the Ring-test to be a reliable test also in this 
context. 
12 In this experiment each participant, randomly matched with another participant, received an endowment of 10 
markers to be allocated to a private account (with a monetary payoff of 28*i − i2 cents for i markers) and a public 
account (with a fixed payoff of 14 cents per marker); in addition there was a fixed cost of 110 cents. This game 
was repeated for a fixed number of rounds, with the same partner. Assuming rational and selfish players, the game 
has an interior Nash-equilibrium where 7 markers are put in the private account, and the remainder of the 
endowment is put in the public account (for any endowment larger than 7), whereas contributing all markers to the 
public account is group optimal (efficient).     
Take in Figure 3  
 13
attached to the Other’s payoff was almost never larger than 1 (providing some additional 
empirical support for the plausibility of the assumption that −1 < αj < 1). Secondly, the social 
value orientations thus measured appeared to be correlated with individual contributions to the 
public good, particularly in the beginning of the interaction, confirming the validity of this 
measure. Thirdly, individuals typically responded to an increase (decrease) in the contribution 
by the partner with an increase (decrease) in their own contribution. This reciprocity can be 
interpreted as providing evidence of a continuous development of social ties (with sentiments 
being correlated with observed contributions), but it may also (partly) reflect some kind of 
strategic behavior (like conditional cooperation, see Keser and van Winden, 2000). Fourthly, 
using earnings in the public good game as an indicator of successful interaction (as they are 
positively related to the contributions by the partner), a clear impact on the angle of the second 
Ring-test was found, given the individual’s initial angle (social value orientation); see table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Linear regressions with angle from second Ring-test as dependent variable 
and, as independent variables, social value orientation (angle from first Ring-test) 
and earnings in the last five periods of the public good game (van Dijk et al., 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
In this case, the second Ring-test was applied unexpectedly after 25 periods of play (out of a 
total of 32 periods). Similar results were obtained in an experiment with the second test being 
applied at the end, after the same number of periods. This suggests that ties are developed 
continuously. Also, different measures of success did not qualitatively affect the findings.13  
Sonnemans et al. (2006) extended the experimental study of van Dijk et al. (2002) to a 
similar public good game with four instead of two players. To avoid an excessive time 
consumption by the second Ring-test (unexpectedly applied after 25 periods), where now each 
participant would have to make multiple (in fact 32) self-other payoff allocation decisions 
concerning, successively, each of the three partners in the game, they applied a simpler 
technique: the Circle-test. In the Circle-test, participants have to make a self-other payoff 
                                                 
13 Another interesting observation is that in an experiment with unequal endowments (with one player having 8 
markers and the other player 12 markers) they found that the contributions by participants with the higher 
endowment (in excess of the Nash-equilibrium prediction) were significantly less, in line with the predictions of 
the vDvW-model. 
Social value orientation 0.715       0.141         0.564          5.056      0.000     
Earnings period 21-25 0.048         0.019         0.283          2.536      0.015 
Constant          −33.074       14.661                         −2.256       0.029 
Multiple R: 0.712  
Adjusted R2: 0.484 
       B             SE B         Beta               t           Sign. t 
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allocation only once by clicking on a circle, like in figure 3. With groups, this technique is 
much more convenient, although it is obviously noisier due to the single decision that is to be 
made. Their main findings are the following: On average, it turns out that contributions are 
quite similar to what is observed in the two-player game. However, a large variance is 
observed between groups, with some groups being highly successful, and others failing 
strongly in the provision of the public good. Table 2 shows the outcomes of the different 
attitude (Circle-test) measures. Almost all participants showed a non-negative social value 
orientation, with almost half of them maintaining a positive attitude towards a generalized 
(randomly selected and anonymous) other. As observed for the two-player game, almost 
always the first Circle-test angle is between −45° and +45° (98% of the cases). Sentiments 
towards the specific others interacted with − measured by the second Circle-tests, after the 
game − turn out to be more negative. Finally, in terms of social ties − measured by the 
difference in the angles derived from the second and the first Circle-tests − an almost equal 
percentage is observed for positive and negative ones. About half of the participants with a 
neutral (zero) first angle developed at least some tie with the others interacted with. 
 
Table 2. Attitudes of participants towards others (Sonnemans et al., 2006). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * Neutral attitudes correspond to Circle-test angles between −5° and +5°. 
 
In support of the vDvW-model it is further found that differences in the second Circle-test 
angles with respect to specific others are correlated with the differences in their contributions, 
which suggests that during the game participants have built bonds with specific group 
members, rather than a general ‘group cohesion’. Also, responses in the debriefing 
questionnaire to the question of whether one would want to continue the game with a specific 
partner (asked separately for each of the three partners) are strongly correlated with sentiments 
and ties. This speaks for the validity of the social ties measure. Interestingly, mutually positive 
or negative ties are observed in only 15% of the cases (mutual neutrality in 19% of the cases). 
Apparently, even an environment in which participants have equal endowments and payoff 
structures, individual differences in social value orientation and behavioral response patterns 
Social value orientation   26 (47%)  28 (51%)        1 (2%)               55      
  (first Circle-test) 
Sentiments towards specific     80 (48%)         73 (44%)        12 (8%)            165  
  other (second Circle-test)         
Social ties                                 41 (25%)         76 (46%)        48 (29%)          165 
  (difference in Circle-tests)                          
      Positive          Neutral*          Negative          Total    
 15
result in complex dynamics, mostly generating asymmetric ties. These results would seem to 
qualify the suggestion borne out by the ‘minimal group paradigm’ and social identity theory 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994) that social cohesion is easily 
established.14 
Up to now, the support for the vDvW-model of social ties has been only indirect in the 
sense that no direct evidence has been provided for the affective mechanism assumedly 
underlying social ties.15 A recent experimental study by Brandts et al. (2007) fills this gap. One 
of their experiments concerns a repeated social dilemma game, where each of the two players 
can either choose to cooperate or not to cooperate. As in a linear public good game it is a 
dominant strategy in the stage (one-shot) game not to cooperate, even though they would 
obtain a higher payoff if both would cooperate. The authors used the Circle-test before and 
after the interaction, to measure social value orientation and the ex post sentiment towards the 
other player. In addition, after the interaction but before the second Circle-test, they measured 
the positive and/or negative emotions participants experienced (like anger, joy, guilt, etc.) and 
with what intensity, using self-reports.16  
Their main findings are, first, that interaction success (in terms of earnings) is clearly 
positively (negatively) correlated with the positive (negative) emotions participants 
experienced after the interaction. However, it turns out that interaction success does not help 
much to explain sentiment towards the partner as measured by the second Circle-test. In a 
regression model with social value orientation and interaction success as other explanatory 
variables, only emotions show a clear impact (as does the individual’s social value orientation) 
and significantly improve the fit of the model. More specifically, guilt and surprise show a 
positive impact, whereas a strongly negative effect is observed from contempt. Thus, it appears 
that interaction success triggered (some) emotions, which in turn produced a positive or 
negative social tie with the individual interacted with. These experimental results indeed 
suggest that the development of ties is mediated by emotions, as hypothesized in the vDvW-
model. 
 
 
3 Towards the neuroeconomics of social ties 
 
                                                 
14 The results also plead against inequity-aversion. In only 4% of the cases positive-negative combinations of 
sentiments are observed, while such combinations should occur if indeed a participant with large earnings in the 
game (a free rider) would typically give (+) to a little earning participant (who contributed a lot) and the latter 
would typically take (−) from the former.     
15 Another important issue that is awaiting investigation is to what extent behavior indeed converges as suggested 
by the model. 
16 Subjects only learned the nature of a specific part of the experiment once that part started. 
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The experimental support found for the vDvW-model depends for the affective part on the 
validity of the self-report measures that were used. Although there is evidence showing that 
self-reports in economic game experiments correlate with physiological measures of 
emotionality (see e.g. Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007), there are clear limitations to this often-used 
technique of measuring emotions.  One example is the fact that it relies on consciously 
experienced feelings and honest reporting. Therefore, it would be interesting to see what 
evidence can be mustered from modern neuroscientific methods like brain imaging. This would 
fit into the gradually emerging interdisciplinary field of neuroeconomics (Camerer et al., 2005; 
Rustichini, 2005; Sanfey et al., 2006). Within this approach, researchers combine traditions 
from human and animal experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience with 
mathematical decision models, often using simple experimental games, like the prisoner’s 
dilemma game17 (see Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Sanfey, 2007).  
To prepare the grounds for a model-based neural analysis, in this section, after a short 
reminder of the nature of social ties and a discussion of related constructs, we will review the 
existing evidence of neural correlates. Several cognitive and affective processes may underlie 
or be involved in social tie formation, each perhaps playing a role at different moments of the 
social interaction. Below, the processes that may be relevant for the development of a social tie 
in a public good game will be evaluated, and we will discuss and speculate on the possible 
neural bases of these processes and their dynamics.  
 
 
3.1 Constructs related to social ties 
 
An important feature of a social tie is its dynamic stock-variable nature. While social ties are 
presumed to be nonexistent when individuals meet for the first time, they are taken to develop 
rapidly during a relatively short period of interaction (minutes to hours). Affective feelings 
towards the other may start to develop already during the initial moments of social interaction. 
Whether these affective feelings result in a positive or negative tie will depend on one's 
appraisal of the other's behavior. If the other’s behavior is in line with one’s interests, this can 
be considered as an impulse for the development of a positive social tie. A positive social tie in 
the two-person public good game exists to the extent that one positively cares about the payoff 
of the other player in excess of one’s care for a ‘generalized other.’ Formally, this is captured 
by a weight attached to the other’s welfare, which is net of the weight representing one’s social 
                                                 
17 A prisoner’s dilemma game can be seen as a simple two-player public good game with only two choices 
available to the players, either to ‘cooperate’ (equivalent to contributing one’s endowment to the public good)) or 
to ‘defect’ (not contributing to the public good). 
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value orientation. A negative social tie develops when the behavior of the other is not in line 
with one’s own interests. A social tie is not necessarily symmetric: one may be concerned 
about the payoff of the other in the public good game, while the other is not concerned (as 
much) about your welfare. 
 Of the numerous concepts that are used to describe social behavior in psychology, the 
notions of empathy and sympathy seem of particular relevance here. Empathy, which roughly 
refers to the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes,” is commonly considered to have three 
characteristics (Lamm et al., 2007): (1) affective sharing, that is, an affective response to 
another person which may entail sharing that person’s (imagined) emotional state; (2) 
perspective taking, involving a cognitive capacity to take the other person’s perspective; and 
(3) cognitive appraisal, involving monitoring mechanisms that keep track of the origins (self 
vs. other) of the experienced feelings. The third property refers to the generally accepted view 
that empathy requires a link, but no confusion, between the self and other (Decety and Hodges, 
2006). This property seems to dissociate empathy from the concept of a (positive) social tie, 
which involves a kind of merger between the self and the other into some shared identity, 
accompanied by a (‘we’) feeling of bonding. 
Empathy further appears to be subject to contextual appraisal and modulation, and 
supposedly exists because it facilitates social communication and helps forecast other people’s 
needs and actions (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). These properties are clearly important for 
the development of social ties. However, negative experimental findings concerning the 
presumed link between empathy and altruism (the capacity to act selflessly) point again at an 
important difference with (positive) social ties. According to Maner et al. (2002; Cialdini et al., 
1997), the relation with helping put forward in the literature appears to be due to two 
concomitant non-altruistic factors: perceived oneness and experienced negative affect (which 
in turn mediates helping). Oneness (merged identity with the person in need) stimulates 
emphatic concern as well as helping, which may further function as an emotional signal of 
oneness.  
Consequently, while empathy can be regarded as an important factor in the 
development of social ties, it particularly differs from the latter construct in the motivational 
role that the other plays. During social tie development, the cognitive capacity to understand 
the mental state of the other plays an important role as the capacity of perspective taking is 
accompanied by feelings of attachments (e.g. friendship, familiarity and similarity, see also 
Cialdini et al., 1997) or aversion. Taking the perspective of the other while at the same time 
attending to the other’s behavior can lead to an empathic affective response (which does not 
require any direct emotional stimulation). However, empathy is not identical to a social tie as 
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perceived here, because the merger of self and other in some shared identity is absent in 
empathy, where the self and the other remain separate entities. 
The concept of sympathy seems more closely related to a (positive) social tie. Most 
scholars seem to agree that sympathy is an affective response that frequently stems from 
empathy and consists of feelings of concern for another person. According to Decety and 
Chaminade (2003), sympathetic concern indicates that there is affinity, agreement, and 
association with someone. Anything that affects oneself is supposed to similarly affect the 
other. This is in line with our description of a (positive) social tie. To the extent that 
interactions between individuals are experienced as positive (assumedly fostering a positive 
social tie), feelings of affinity, agreement, and association are likely to grow as well. However, 
it is important to note that the opposite may also occur; namely, negatively experienced social 
interactions (inducing feelings of antipathy, dislike, and dissociation with the other) may foster 
the development of a negative tie.  
Interestingly, the founding father of economics as a science, Adam Smith, referred to 
(habitual) sympathy as an underlying factor driving affective (kin and non-kin) relationships 
representative of social ties (Smith, 1759). Furthermore, in his view, social ties abound even in 
competitive business environments, as illustrated by the following quote (op. cit., p.224): 
“Colleagues in office, partners in trade, call one another brothers; and frequently feel towards 
one another as if they really were so. Their good agreement is an advantage to all (…)”.18  
 
 
3.2 Neural correlates of constructs related to social ties 
 
With respect to the dynamic formation of social ties, the key features of empathy and sympathy 
appear to be perspective taking, cognitive appraisal, and concern about the other’s well-being. 
The first two components encompass factors such as ‘mentalizing’ and ‘theory of mind’ and 
entail the processing of norms like fairness. The latter component may encompass processes 
related to altruism, generosity, reciprocity, oneness, and so on. Below, we will selectively 
review the literature on the neural bases of each of these three components. 
 
3.2.1 Perspective taking – What would the other think? 
 
Especially during the first rounds of the public good game, the capacity to take the perspective 
                                                 
18 Later, Edgeworth (1881) called a parameter similar to our α a “coefficient of effective sympathy”, in a footnote 
(p. 53) in his classic book Mathematical Psychics.     
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of the other is essential for both players. This capacity (often referred to as ‘mentalizing’) 
enables one to explain and predict the emotions and actions of the other. This cognitive 
capacity of perspective taking is also known as 'theory of mind.’ Having a theory of mind 
(ToM) means that one recognizes that the other has a different perspective of the world than 
oneself, and that his or her behavior may be determined by different goals than one’s own. 
Understanding the actions of someone facilitates the effective development of a social tie.  
 Functional neuroimaging has been invoked to help identify neural mechanisms 
underlying ToM. Evidence from such studies highlights the role of a number of areas in the 
brain (e.g. Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe, 2006). However, most of these studies did not 
involve actual social interactions. Instead, in these experiments participants were asked to 
reason about the mental states of characters that were presented in stories, cartoons, or 
photographs (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Brunet et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000). Only few 
studies examined the neural correlates of mentalizing in participants who were immersed in 
actual social interactions, or in which participants believed they were interacting with a real 
human being while in actuality responses of the partner were generated and administered by a 
computer algorithm (Gallagher et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004a). These 
studies show that two brain areas are particularly important for mentalizing in fictive situations 
and are associated with ToM in actual social interactions. These brain areas are the anterior 
paracingulate cortex (APCC) and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). 
 
Anterior paracingulate cortex  
 
McCabe et al. (2001) reported dorsomedial prefrontal regions to be activated when subjects 
were playing a ’trust game’ with a human partner. In this two-person sequential game, the first 
mover could decide to either end the game (which leads to a fixed equal payoff to both players) 
or to let the other player (the trustee) choose between an option where both players would be 
better off and an option where only the second player would benefit but the first player would 
lose, compared to their payoffs when the game is ended by the first mover (the trustor). Of 
most interest, McCabe et al. (2001) observed that the APCC is activated when trustees make 
cooperative decisions, that is, when they choose not to be selfish but go for the option where 
both players benefit. The authors suggest the APCC to be an “active convergence zone that 
binds joint attention to mutual gains with sufficient inhibition of immediate reward 
gratification to allow cooperative decisions”.  
 Krueger et al. (2007) replicated and extended this finding using a similar, albeit non-
anonymous, sequential reciprocal trust game in which partnership building and maintenance 
became essential. The APCC was shown to be critically involved in building a trust 
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relationship by inferring another person’s intentions to predict subsequent behavior.  
 In a study by Rilling et al. (2004a), the APCC is also reported as an important neural 
correlate of ToM. In their experiment the APCC was activated when participants were playing 
a series of a one-shot ultimatum game19 and a series of a one-shot sequential prisoner's 
dilemma game. In both games, participants observed their partner’s decision before they had to 
respond (with either acceptance or rejection of the offer in the ultimatum game, and with 
cooperation or defection in the prisoner’s dilemma game). The decision a participant makes 
depends on how s/he interprets the action of the partner. 
 
Posterior superior temporal sulcus  
 
In addition to the APCC, Rilling et al. (2004a) also found the pSTS to be more active when 
participants believed they were playing these games against a human being instead of a 
computer. Studies that examined the ToM ability by asking participants to mentalize about 
characters (instead of real human beings) consistently activated the STS area (Brunet et al., 
2000; Castelli et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000). It has been suggested that the role of the 
STS is related to an initial analysis of social cues to provide a signal of the intention of another 
individual (Allison et al., 2000).  
 
3.2.2 Appraisal – Is the behavior of the other in line with one’s own 
interests? 
 
Some people may readily develop a social tie, while others need more time to develop affective 
feelings towards the other player in the public good game. Whether one cares about the other’s 
concerns will depend on the perceived importance of the other person’s behavior for one’s own 
concerns, including internalized social norms (Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). If the other 
behaves according to one’s social norms, then this may function as an impulse for the 
development of a positive social tie. Fairness norms, in particular, play a role in the modulation 
of social relations (Dawes et al., 2007). The implementation of fairness norms in the public 
good game leads one to expect the other to reciprocate investments in the public good. In the  
case that a player plays unfairly (i.e., does not contribute to the public good), this may indulge 
negative feelings in the other towards this player. Brain areas that play a role in the 
implementation of fairness-related behavior are discussed below.  
                                                 
19 An ultimatum game is a two-player game where one player gets the opportunity to make an offer regarding the 
division of an amount of money given by the experimenter and the other player can either accept or reject. In the 
latter case both players get nothing (Güth et al., 1982). 
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The striatum 
 
The striatum appears to be involved in monitoring the other’s decision to reciprocate 
cooperation or not, presumably in order to facilitate learning who can and who cannot be 
trusted as a social partner. In a prisoner’s dilemma game, each participant probably makes an 
estimate of the likelihood that his or her cooperation will be reciprocated, even though this 
estimate is unlikely to be correct. The discrepancy between the actual choice of cooperation (0 
or 1) and the probability with which cooperation by the other player is predicted is the reward 
prediction error. Positive reward prediction errors (as elicited by reciprocated cooperation) 
have been found to correlate with increased activity in the striatum, while negative reward 
prediction errors (elicited by unreciprocated cooperation) were associated with a decreased 
activation (Rilling et al., 2002; Rilling et al., 2004b). Thus, the striatum appears to register 
social prediction errors (and perhaps encodes the positive feeling garnered by mutual 
cooperation) to guide decisions about reciprocity (Sanfey, 2007).  
 King-Casas et al. (2005) found that activity in the caudate nucleus (part of the striatum) 
was modulated by reciprocity in a multi-round trust game. Benevolent reciprocity (when the 
trustor is generous in response to a defection by the trustee in the previous round) was 
associated with greater activity of the caudate nucleus in the trustee's brain than malevolent 
reciprocity (when the trustor repays the generosity of the trustee with selfishness). These 
results confirm the suggestion that the striatum registers the benevolence of the other's decision 
and guides decisions about reciprocity. Furthermore, in the beginning of the trust game, the 
caudate was most active after the decision of the trustor was revealed, but as the game 
progressed, activity in the caudate shifted its time of occurrence to a time before that decision. 
Thus, the dynamics of activation patterns in the caudate reveal that as the social interactions 
progress, the trustee learns to develop intentions to trust or distrust the other player. 
 
Anterior Insula  
 
Experiments with the ultimatum game suggest that activation seen in the insula reflects one's 
negative emotional response to ‘unfair’ offers, that is, offers where one gets less than an even-
split (Sanfey et al., 2003). The insula is a brain region that is often associated with negative 
emotional states (Calder et al., 2001; Damasio et al., 2000). In the study by Sanfey et al. 
(2003), activity in the anterior insula is greater when participants in the ultimatum game are 
offered unfair instead of fair splits of money. Furthermore, activity in this brain area was 
predictive of the decision to reject unfair offers, with rejections associated with significantly 
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higher activation than acceptances. The anterior insula has been suggested to encode the social 
interaction as aversive, serving to discourage trust and positive responses (Sanfey, 2007), or, 
alternatively, to encode the degree of unfairness of the other’s offer, that is, how much the offer 
differs from some norm (Montague and Lohrenz, 2007).  
 
Anterior cingulate cortex  
 
Activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain area involved in processing signals that 
register as a risk (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), is also involved in the decision to accept or reject 
unfair offers in the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003). The ACC is known for its role in 
cognitive conflict and its activation may reflect the tension between cognitive and emotional 
motivations when persons consider rejecting an unfair offer. Using an iterated trust game, 
Tomlin et al. (2006) found two distinct agent-specific response types in the ACC, one 
consistent with decisions that signal “me” and another consistent with decisions that signal 
“not me”.  
 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex  
 
Besides the influence of emotional states on the decision to accept or reject unfair behavior (as 
reflected by insular activity), cognitive processes are also of importance in this decision. 
Sanfey et al. (2003) observed that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a region usually 
linked to cognitive control processes such as goal maintenance (Miller and Cohen, 2001), plays 
a role during the ultimatum game. Possibly, competition between the anterior insula and the 
DLPFC is important in the decision to accept or reject an unfair offer. Activity in the DLPFC 
was higher than activity in the anterior insula when participants decided to accept unfair offers, 
while unfair offers that were rejected showed instead greater activity in the insula than in the 
DLPFC.  
 Studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have elaborated on the role of the 
DLPFC in the decision to accept or reject unfair behavior (Knoch et al., 2006; van 't Wout et 
al., 2005). These studies suggest that the DLPFC is involved in overriding selfish impulses in 
order to reject offers that are perceived as unfair. Disrupting brain activity in the DLPFC by the 
administration of a brief TMS pulse caused a greater number of unfair offers to be accepted in 
this group of participants compared to the control group.20  
 
                                                 
20 As noted by Knoch et al. (2006), these findings run counter to the interpretation of Sanfey et al. (2003) that the 
DLPFC is crucial in overriding fairness impulses (to reject unfair offers). 
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3.2.3 Beneficial behavior – Care about the other’s welfare 
 
Both processes discussed so far, the ability to reason about one's partner's intentions and the 
impulse that determines if a social tie may start to develop, are important for the development 
of a social tie between participants in the public good game. Neural correlates of these 
processes have been suggested. However, what happens in the brain when one indeed has 
started to care about the other player?  
 
ACC and insula  
 
Results of an experimental study with an iterated one-shot trust game by Singer et al. (2006) 
showed that neuronal activity in the ACC and in the anterior insula are modulated as a function 
of whether the subjects liked or disliked their partner in the game. In the second part of this 
experiment, participants observed partners who had played fair and unfair strategies (that is, 
reciprocated with large and small amounts, respectively) receiving painful stimulation. Unfair 
players were rated as less likeable than fair players. Activity in pain-related brain areas (the 
anterior insula and the ACC) was attenuated by the knowledge that an unfair player was in 
pain. The finding that responses to fair and unfair behavior are related to the affective feelings 
one has towards another lends support to the notion that brain activity in the public good game 
may be modulated as a function of a social tie.21 In this respect, the activation of the anterior 
insula might be a case in point. Its putative role in risk prediction (Knutson and Bossaerts, 
2007; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) and in signaling norm violations (Montague and Lohrenz, 
2007) suggests that under the formation of a positive social tie its role in social decision-
making will diminish22, whereas under the formation of a negative social tie it will be more 
active. The latter is suggested also by the role of anterior insula activation in frustration (Abler 
et al., 2005). 
 
Orbitofrontal cortex 
 
Arranging and experiencing mutual cooperation in economic interactions has been related to 
the reception of reward. Cooperative behavior in an iterated one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game 
                                                 
21 In fact, in male participants the effect was accompanied by increased activity in reward-related areas (striatum), 
which was correlated with an expressed desire for revenge. These findings are suggestive of a negative tie, as 
these participants appear to experience the loss in well-being of the person in pain as rewarding. 
22 Instead, evidence from studies on maternal and romantic love relationships points at a potentially increasing 
role of the medial insula in that case (Aron et al., 2005; Bartels and Zeki, 2004). The medial insula is considered 
to be a pathway for ‘limbic touch,’ evoking pleasant feelings of touch and regulating affiliative responses. 
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has been found to elicit increased activity in reward-related areas such as the striatum (caudate 
nucleus, nucleus accumbens, and putamen), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Rilling et al., 2002; Rilling et al., 2004b). These areas receive 
mesencephalic dopamine projections and play an essential role in the processing of rewards, 
such as food, drugs, sex, and money (Moll et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 1997; Tanaka et al., 
2004). Regarding the OFC, there is general agreement on a medial to lateral functional 
specialization within the OFC on behavior that is related to reward and punishment. The lateral 
OFC has been linked to punishment and associated with social aversion (Kringelbach, 2005; 
Moll et al., 2005). The medial part of the OFC is suggested to be more important for reward-
related behavior (Kringelbach, 2005). Although the OFC was activated during cooperation in 
the prisoner's dilemma game, its response was not dependent on the context, that is, whether 
the partner was a computer or a human being. In contrast, increased activation in the striatum 
and VMPFC after a cooperative outcome was only elicited when a human partner reciprocated 
cooperation, but not in the case of a computer partner (or when an equivalent amount of money 
was simply provided). These results indicate that successful interaction with human partners is 
particularly rewarding.23 
 
Striatum and septal area 
 
Activation of the striatum is modulated by several factors that might be related to the strength 
of social ties. For instance, Flieβbach et al. (2007) showed that responses in the ventral 
striatum are modulated by social comparison. Rewards that were equal in absolute magnitude 
elicited smaller responses in the striatum when the reward was less than that received by a 
second person. Harbaugh et al.(2007) observed that donations to charity goals elicit activity in 
the ventral striatum, but more so when these donations were voluntary than when they were 
mandatory. Moreover, the striatal response to the charity's financial gains predicted voluntary 
giving. 
 Delgado et al. (2005) examined how prior social and moral information about someone 
modulated striatal activity. They replicated earlier findings in that activity in the caudate 
nucleus differentiated between reciprocated and unreciprocated cooperation in the trust game 
(cf. Rilling et al., 2004b). However, when information was provided about the character of the 
partner, either good or bad, this differential response in the striatum between positive and 
                                                 
23 This finding may be related to a positive social tie, because an extra reward is obtained from the presence of a 
human partner with whom one interacted successfully. Using fMRI with a social interaction simulation task, 
Güroğlu et al. (2008) find that interacting with friends specifically involves the VMPFC and the nucleus 
accumbens. In addition, they find friend-specific involvement of the amygdala and the hippocampus, which may 
indicate the spontaneously greater retrieval of emotionally salient memories in case of the interaction with friends. 
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negative feedback was absent. This suggests that perceptions of moral character can diminish 
reliance on feedback mechanisms in an area that is involved in social reward learning. 
 More generally, the striatum is seen as part of a modality-independent network of reward 
structures that is specialized to mediate attachment (Bartels and Zeki, 2004, see also above). 
This network is generally rich in receptors of oxytocin, a neuropeptide that is well-known for 
its relationship with attachment and caring behavior (Insel and Young, 2001).24 Zak et al. 
(2007) found that participants infused (via nasal administration) with oxytocin exhibited 
greater generosity in dictator as well as ultimatum games.25 Kosfeld et al. (2005), using a 
similar technique, found a substantial increase in trusting behavior in a trust game, but no 
difference in the acceptance of financial risks, suggesting an essential role for oxytocin as 
biological basis for a pro-social approach. 
 In their reciprocal trust game study, Krueger et al. (2007) observed for non-defectors 
(who never defected on the partner’s decision to trust), after a ‘building’ stage where the 
paracingulate cortex was relatively active, that their unconditional trust selectively activated 
the septal area (relative to defectors) during the subsequent ‘maintenance’ stage. This brain 
region, linked to social memory and learning, contains oxytocin receptors and is putatively 
involved in controlling the release of oxytocin.26 Furthermore, behavioral ratings revealed that 
only non-defector pairs felt closer to each other and ranked themselves as being more of a 
partner to the other person after the experiment. According to the authors, this brain area may 
be involved in encoding goodwill. Also, some evidence exists showing that oxytocin can be 
enhanced by receiving signals of trust in a trust game, which in turn may lead to greater 
trustworthiness (Zak et al., 2005). 
 
3.3 Neural bases of social ties: Some speculations 
 
Based on the findings summarized in the previous subsection, it seems that a social tie can 
show up in various ways. In general, it may manifest itself in an increased activation in some 
brain region (like the striatum), in a changing timing and/or location of the activation within 
some region (like the striatum with learning27), in the involvement of new regions (like the 
                                                 
24 Oxytocin is also implicated in addiction. There seem to be similar pathways for social attachment and 
psychostimulants (Insel and Young, 2001). 
25 A dictator game differs from an ultimatum game in that the second mover can only accept what the first player 
‘proposes’. 
26 From a learning perspective, it is interesting to note that whereas the septal area as well as the pallidum have 
been found to play a role in early-stage romantic love relationships, the pallidum appeared to gain in importance 
in relationships of longer duration (Aron et al., 2005; Bartels and Zeki, 2004). 
27 Regarding the former, see King-Casas et al. (2005), and, with respect to the latter, Haruno and Kawato (2006).  
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septal area, linked to attachment), or a diminished involvement of some regions (like the 
paracingulate cortex). Regarding the last point, Bartels and Zeki (2004) speak of human 
attachment as a “push-pull mechanism” that overcomes social distance by deactivating neural 
networks used for critical social judgment and negative emotions while bonding individuals 
through the reward circuitry. Therefore, it seems likely that the weight that is attached to the 
wellbeing of another person is represented by a compound neural network rather than some 
specific brain area. Nevertheless, some brain regions may be critical, like the amygdala and the 
VMPFC that appear to be essential for the activation and successful integration of emotion-
related memories (e.g., of sanctions) in the anticipation of future consequences of actions (see 
e.g. Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Güroğlu et al., 2008). 
 Although we do not know at this stage what this network precisely looks like, we can 
speculate regarding its nature, under the usual caveat implied by such speculations. We 
assume, for simplicity, two players in a public good game who are initially complete strangers 
to each other (no existing ties), and we neglect any social value orientation (we will return to 
that later). Furthermore, for expositional reasons, we focus on the development of a positive 
tie. 
 Our discussion in the previous subsection suggests three key facets of the development 
of an affective social tie: perspective taking, appraisal, and care28. Particularly in the beginning 
of the game, players are likely to be engaged with fathoming the situation the other is in and 
what the other will think. Two brain areas have been particularly associated with this 
‘mentalizing,’ the APCC and the pSTS. Behavioral expectations on the basis of norms or other 
reference levels may be generated. In terms of the simple ties model presented in section 2, this 
might shape the tolerance or reference level εA (see eq. (2)). Appraisals of the other’s behavior 
during the game in light of one’s concerns (including internalized norms) and adjusting beliefs 
are important for the further cognitive and affective encoding of the signals extracted from the 
social interaction. Brain areas expected to be particularly involved in these appraisal processes 
are related to reward prediction and learning (striatum), norm violations (anterior insula), 
cognition-emotion conflict (ACC), and cognitive control (DLPFC). In the formal model this 
facet of tie formation is, as a first approach, represented in a simplistic way by the ‘impulse’ 
GA. Personality traits (e.g., related to emotionality) may cause a substantial heterogeneity 
among individuals in the way these appraisals are made and elaborated. Both processes of 
perspective taking and appraisal, finally, may set in motion a growing appreciation (care) for 
                                                 
28 The neural circuits involved in perspective taking and appraisal will likely involve common areas irrespective 
of whether the social tie will develop positively or negatively. Below we will speculate on the potentially 
differential involvement of brain areas in the third phase of positive and negative tie formation.   
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the concerns of the partner in the game, which is represented in the model by the (stock) 
variable αA attached to the utility of the other individual. Brain areas presumably implicated 
once an individual has started to (positively) care about the other individual29 are the striatum, 
the VMPFC 30, and the septal area. In the next, concluding section several issues for future 
research will be indicated. 
 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this article we have addressed the economic importance, formalization, and the 
psychological and neural correlates of affective social ties. We hope to have shown the 
promising nature of this topic and conclude with some important issues for future research. 
 First of all, it is now important to link up the parameters of formal models of social ties 
with neural activity, for example, through model-based fMRI studies. In this way, a systematic 
and empirical data-based approach is obtained that lends itself for the generation of a coherent 
set of hypotheses and the development of a well-founded neuroeconomics of social ties. 
 Secondly, a dynamic model of social ties is needed because emotion is all about 
transition and more related to homeodynamics (behavioral adjustment) than homeostasis 
(Damasio, 2003). In this respect, the dual-system vDvW-model discussed above seems a good 
starting point for the study of voluntary public good provision. However, a more flexible 
model, for example, allowing for some foresight or the influence of moods or personality traits, 
may be desirable. 
 Thirdly, because the state of the art in neuroeconomics is such that no definitive 
answers are to be expected from whichever method or technique one uses, it is important to 
exploit as many research tools as possible. This includes not only various neuroscientific 
techniques like TMS, physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance or heart rate), the 
administration of substances (like oxytocin), or the use of individuals with brain lesions, but 
                                                 
29 We can speculate that the development of negative ties involves several areas.  First, as in positive tie 
formation, the striatum is expected to be involved as it detects unreciprocated cooperation in the trust game 
(Delgado et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2004b). Also, increased activity of the striatum was correlated with observed 
physical pain in a disliked individual (Singer et al., 2006), suggesting a rewarding experience (like ‘sweet’ 
revenge), as one would expect in case of a negative tie. Second, as the anterior insula is implicated in signaling 
norm violations (Montague and Lohrenz, 2007) and in encoding aversive interaction (Sanfey, 2007), it is likely to 
be more active under the formation of negative social ties, as suggested also by the role of anterior insula 
activation in frustration (Abler et al., 2005).  
30 A recent study (Jenkins et al., 2008) suggests that the VMPFC is similarly engaged by mentalizing about 
oneself as by mentalizing about similar others. To the extent that a positive tie makes people feel more similar this 
finding would add to the role of the VMPFC. 
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also questionnaires (e.g., for the measurement of traits, particular emotional states or 
expectations). Furthermore, the simultaneous investigation of interacting brains through 
hyperscanning may deliver important additional information, for example, in relation to the 
issue of oneness in case of social ties (Krueger et al., 2007). In the context of social ties, 
oneness (or ‘me-other’ merger) would seem to imply that one’s own payoff should show up as 
being similarly rewarding as the other’s payoff. On the other hand, the fact that one cares about 
the other also implies that, when appropriate, one tries to figure out what is best for the other, 
involving perspective-taking and mentalizing, which means a differentiation between self and 
even a close other (cf. Heatherton et al., 2006). 
 Fourthly, among the important (additional) issues to be studied are the impact of the 
mode and the frequency of interaction. For example, to what extent is interaction with others 
through political participation to provide a public good different from decentralized provision 
via voluntary contributions? Apart from the frequency of interaction, factors determining 
emotional intensity, such as proximity and anonymity, would seem to be important here. 
 Another interesting issue concerns the equilibration of a social tie. The vDvW-model 
allows for an equilibrium state with a social tie, where the decay of the tie is just compensated 
by the impulse. However, if emotion is indeed all about transition and homeodynamics, it is 
not immediately clear whether an affective tie is compatible with an equilibrium state where 
nothing unexpected happens. This is not the place to go more deeply into this issue. Note, 
however, that the incorporation of randomness in the model − which may be appropriate 
because of the stochasticity in neural firing rates, for example (Glimcher et al., 2005) − would 
imply some unpredictability of behavior. 
 Fifthly, what is the relationship, if any, between social value orientation and social ties? 
To what extent is it simply an aggregate (weighted) representation of one’s (past and present) 
social ties?31  
 Finally, in view of the observed similarities between romantic love and addiction 
regarding the use of reward structures in the brain, it seems of interest to investigate the 
(dis)similarities between addiction and different forms of attachment, including social ties. In 
all these cases, affective impulses (like an investment) are feeding an intertemporal stock 
variable. On a different and more speculative note, a similar production process seems to take 
place in case of the internalization of a social norm, where through the application of sanctions 
(punishments and rewards) a concern or interest is instilled in the individual. Therefore, it 
might be interesting to include the internalization of norms into this investigation as well.
                                                 
31 For some empirical support, see Van Lange et al. (1997) 
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Figure 1. Phase diagram of equation (3): (a) with decay, (b) without decay. 
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Figure 2. Phase diagram of equations (3) with identical individuals (using 
GA(αA, αB) and GB(αB, αA)), with A: fA = 0, B: fB = 0. 
Figure 3. Example of self-other payoff combination in the Ring-test. 
